This paper presents a model of nations where agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces agents' preferences over different geographical configurations, thus determining the likelihood of secessions or unions. After calibrating the model to Europe, we identify the regions prone to secession and the countries most likely to merge. As a test of the theory, we show that the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dynamics of its disintegration. We also provide empirical support for the use of genetic distances as a proxy for cultural heterogeneity.
Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed large-scale map redrawing. Some countries, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, have broken up, while others have moved towards closer cooperation, as epitomized by the European Union, and to a lesser extent, ASEAN. Theory suggests that the size of a nation is determined by the trade-off between scale economies that benefit larger nations and the costs of population heterogeneity that favor smaller countries (see, e.g., Spolaore, 1997, 2003 , and Bolton and Roland, 1997) . Although there is some reduced-form evidence supportive of this tradeoff, 1 an empirical and quantitative exploration of its plausibility within a structural model has so far been lacking. Our paper addresses this shortcoming by proposing a theoretical model, calibrating it to the European experience, and analyzing its predictions for the breakup of Yugoslavia and for other 'weak links' in the European map.
In our theoretical model with multiple regions and countries, agents in every country vote on the optimal level of public spending, taking into account increasing returns in the provision of public goods. However, the utility derived from public goods is decreasing in the country's degree of cultural heterogeneity. Assuming that the tax rate in every country is chosen by majority voting, we compare a region's welfare across different political arrangements. This allows us to study whether regions or countries would like to unite or secede. We use two alternative stability concepts: one requires that any rearrangement should have the support of the majority in each affected region, while another allows for unilateral secessions.
Since the main goal of the paper is to empirically explore the stability of countries, the most crucial issue in linking our model to the data is the empirical measurement of cultural heterogeneity.
We accept the view that the degree of mixing between two populations over the course of history is positively correlated with the similarity of their cultural values. Since populations that have experienced more mixing -or populations that have become separated more recently -are closer genetically, there should be a positive correlation between genetic and cultural distances.
We therefore use genetic distances amongst populations as a proxy for cultural distances. 2 It is important to clarify that we view genetic distances as a record of mixing, and not as an indicator of the link between genes and human behavior.
To assess the empirical plausibility of the theory, we calibrate our model to the current European situation. In particular, we determine the parameter values that are consistent with the European map being stable. We then ask the following questions: 3 What are the weak links in that map? Which regions are more likely to secede? Which countries stand a better chance to cooperate and possibly unite? To answer these questions, we start by increasing the cost associated with cultural heterogeneity, and check which region would be the first to secede. We find that the Basque Country and Scotland are the most likely regions to break away. Consistent with this finding, these are the only two regions in Western Europe where local governments have called for referendums on self-determination. Likewise, by decreasing the perceived cost of cultural heterogeneity, we determine which countries are most likely to unite. When focusing on neighboring countries, Austria and Switzerland top the list of 231 possible pairs, followed by Denmark-Norway, France-Britain, France-Italy, and Belgium-Netherlands. These results suggest that unification is more likely when countries have similar population sizes, similar levels of GDP per capita, and similar cultures. Note that two out of these five pairs were actually united for parts of their history.
Denmark and Norway formed one country from the Middle Ages until 1814, and Belgium and the Netherlands were united from 1384 to 1581, and briefly again after the Treaty of Waterloo in 1815.
The Nordic countries continue to closely cooperate up to the present day in a variety of ways, as does the Benelux. Although reunification may not be on the political agenda, recent polls show that more than two thirds of Dutch support a union with the Flemish part of Belgium, whereas about half of the Flemish want to reunite with the Netherlands. 4 As a more direct test of our theory we analyze whether our calibrated model is able to account for the breakup of Yugoslavia. We start by determining whether the theory predicts that any of the six Yugoslav republics wants to unilaterally break away from the rest of Yugoslavia. If at least one republic prefers to leave the union, we conclude that Yugoslavia is unstable. We then go one step further and study the dynamic process of disintegration. We assume that the republic that gains most from secession breaks away first. Once that republic has left, we recompute the incentives for secession for the remaining republics, given that they are now part of a diminished 3 Although we focus on Europe, this setup could easily be applied to other parts of the world.
Yugoslavia. The next republic to go is then the one who gains most from leaving whatever is left over of Yugoslavia. This process continues until either the whole country has disintegrated or no republic experiences gains from secession.
We find that Yugoslavia was less stable than the rest of Europe. In particular, using parameter values for which, say, the Basque Country and Scotland, have no incentive to secede, Slovenia and Croatia did prefer to leave Yugoslavia. Overall, the model accounts well for the order of disintegration: Slovenia and Croatia always secede, followed possibly by Bosnia and Macedonia, whereas
Montenegro always prefers to stay in the union. These predictions are broadly consistent with historical events. After the dissolution of the all-Yugoslav Communist Party in 1990 Slovenia and Croatia were the only two republics pushing for more devolution, and they both declared independence on the very same day, June 25, 1991 cultural distances between the different Yugoslav republics were not particularly large, we find that economic differences alone were not big enough to pull the country apart. If Yugoslavia had been culturally homogenous, the model predicts the country would have stayed together. That being said, the order of disintegration is largely driven by economics. The first two republics to leave, Slovenia and Croatia, were, respectively, the richest republic and the largest republic, whereas the republic that never wants to leave according to the model, Montenegro, is very small, with a population of just over half a million.
The ability of the model to account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and to closely match the order of its disintegration lends credibility to our theory. It also provides a new tool for the analysis of the stability of nations. In the last couple of years there has been much talk about the viability of countries such as Iraq and Bolivia to survive as unified states. Although these questions are difficult and complex, and answering them requires in-depth knowledge that goes beyond the simplicity of our framework, our paper shows that having a structural model that can make quantitative predictions can shed light on these important policy questions.
Given the importance of cultural heterogeneity in our framework, we now turn to discussing some theoretical and empirical issues related to this notion. To model cultural heterogeneity, we rely on a matrix of cultural distances between nations. We refer to this measure as metric heterogeneity.
Preferences are such that, all else equal, an agent prefers to be part of a nation which minimizes cultural distances. In other words, each agent ranks nations on the basis of how culturally distant they are. The notion of metric heterogeneity we employ is similar to the one described in the literature on cooperative games where players are characterized by their location in a network or in a geographical space. In such a framework the gains from cooperation increase when the distances among the players in the coalition decrease. Le Breton and Weber (1995) focus on the case where two-person coalitions may form and characterize the patterns for which there is a stable group structure. In contrast to their work, we do not allow for unlimited monetary lump sum transfers among players in the group.
Instead of relying on genetic distances as a proxy for cultural distances, an alternative would be to use data from social surveys on individuals' values. However, the answers to many questions in opinion polls are arguably biased by short term events, such as the political business cycle. Since we are interested in long-term decisions -secessions or unifications -information gathered from surveys or opinion polls may not be the most appropriate. Nevertheless, we do explore this type of information, and find a strong correlation between distances based on social surveys and genetic distances. We view this result not as an argument for an extensive use of opinion polls, but rather as lending support to the view that genetic distances are a reasonable proxy for cultural distances.
In addition to genetic distances or social surveys, geographical or linguistic distances may capture the same type of information. Indeed, the relation between genes, languages and geography has been extensively studied in population genetics (see, e.g., Sokal, 1987, and Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994) . However, even after controlling for languages and geography, we find that populations that are similar in genes tend to give more similar answers to opinion polls. 5 Needless to say, our main assumption -more population mixing implies smaller cultural differences -is open to debate. Some authors claim that mixing is not necessary for cultural diffusion to happen (see, e.g., Jobling et al., 2004) . It might be the case that, say, Danes have not mixed much with Germans in the last 30 generations, so that there genetic distance is relatively large. However, cultural diffusion might have taken place through books, newspapers, the education system, religion, etc., making their preferences quite similar. The question of whether the transmission of culture takes place through migration flows and the mixing of populations (demic diffusion) has generated yet another debate in population genetics. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) and Chikhi et al. (2002) have argued for the dominant role played by demic diffusion. Their view has been supported by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) in their study of the diffusion of innovation, whereas Haak et al. (2005) offer an opposite view regarding the diffusion of farming in Europe. 6 The use of genetic distances requires our theory to embed those distances in a multidimensional space. Since the values of genetic distances are based on information of many different genes, they are represented in a multi-dimensional space. Thus, in contrast to much of the existing theoretical work, population heterogeneity in our model is multi-dimensional. Although there may be certain policy issues for which a one-dimensional space suffices, 7 in general this is too restrictive.
For example, if agents who reside in the same county have to decide on the geographic location of a public facility, this problem is, by nature, two-dimensional. Also, agents with the same income may have different views regarding the desired level of redistribution within society. Thus, the search for an optimal public policy is naturally a multi-dimensional problem.
Other relevant work, though not in the context of the trade-off between scale economies and cultural heterogeneity, includes the landscape theory of Axelrod and Bennett (1993) , aimed at predicting the European alignment during the Second World War. They consider a two-bloc setting where each nation is characterized by its propensity to work with other nations. Given the partition of all nations into two blocs, the frustration of a nation is determined as the sum of its propensities towards nations outside the bloc it belongs, and energy is then the weighted sum of the frustrations of all countries. Using the 1936 data, Axelrod and Bennett show that a local energy minimum over two-bloc structures almost exactly corresponds to the wartime alignment in Europe.
A major drawback of their work is the absence of economic forces. Other related work is Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) who estimate the effect of political borders on economic growth and run a number of counterfactual experiments to examine how the union of different countries would affect growth. However, they do not take into account cultural heterogeneity. Also of interest is a recent paper of Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2006) that explores the poor economic performance of "artificial" states, where borders do not match a division of nationalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. 6 See also Ashraf and Galor (2007) on the effect of cultural diffusion on technological innovation. 7 See, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore (1997) .
Section 3 provides empirical support for using genetic distances as a proxy of cultural heterogeneity.
Section 4 calibrates the model to Europe, and explores the likelihood of secessions and unions.
Section 5 tests the theory by analyzing whether the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the order of its disintegration. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
In this section we describe the structure of the model. The world is made up of agents, regions and countries. Agents reside in regions and are geographically immobile. Different agents are endowed with different levels of income. The set of regions is exogenously given. Regions are culturally homogeneous. Countries consist of one or more regions. Cultural differences across regions imply that multi-region countries are culturally heterogeneous. The partition of the set of regions into countries can change, and our goal is to analyze the stability of partitions. Agents derive utility from the consumption of a private good and a public good, which is financed through a country-wide proportional tax rate. The utility derived from the public good is decreasing in the degree of cultural heterogeneity. Tax rates are decided by majority vote at the country level. If a change in partition affects the country a region belongs to, the utility of an agent in that region changes, because the tax rate, the level of the public good, and the degree of cultural heterogeneity change. By imposing intermediate preferences, the median income agent in each region represents the majority of its residents, in spite of the multi-dimensionality problem. We consider two different stability concepts to assess the possibility of map redrawing. One requires the consent of all affected regions, whereas the other allows for unilateral secession. In what follows we present the model's setup, discuss the preferences over different partitions, define the stability concepts, and end by presenting the specific functional forms we will use in the empirical section.
Setup
The world is partitioned into countries, indexed by C, each consisting of one or several regions, The cultural heterogeneity experienced by a resident of region I ∈ C, denoted by H(I, C), is the weighted cultural distance between that resident and all other residents of C. This corresponds to the expected cultural distance between an agent from region I and a randomly drawn agent from country C. Hence,
Note that for residents of one-region countries, H(I, I) is equal to zero.
Each agent i is endowed with a certain amount of income, y i . The income distribution in region I is given by the cumulative density function F I (y) with total mass p(I), whose support [y,ȳ] is common to all regions. We assume that F I (y) is continuous and strictly increasing. The total income in I is denoted by Y (I):
Similarly, Y (C) denotes the total income in country C.
The utility of resident i of region I ∈ C, u(x, g, H(I, C)),depends on private consumption,
x, the level of the public good in his country, g, and the degree of cultural heterogeneity he faces,
The utility function u is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave and increasing in x and g. For simplicity, the prices of the private good and the public good are both set to 1.
Cultural heterogeneity reduces the utility, so that u is decreasing in its last argument, H(I, C). Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) offer two reasons for this homogeneity bias, reflecting the preference of agents for more culturally homogeneous communities. One is that individuals who share a common background may have similar preferences over public goods. Another is that, even if individuals have similar preferences to those in other groups, they may still prefer to interact with members of their own group. The specific functional form we will use in the empirical section is closer in spirit to the first argument. In particular, we will assume that cultural heterogeneity enters negatively by reducing the utility an agent derives from the consumption of the public good.
Public goods are specific to each country, and are financed through a proportional tax rate τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, chosen by majority voting. As is obvious, this implies redistribution. Taxation does not involve deadweight losses, so that if country C selects tax rate τ , the level of the public good will be τ Y (C). The indirect utility v of resident i of region I ∈ C, with income y i and paying a tax rate τ , can be written as
Note that for every country C the preferences of every agent i ∈ C over tax rates are singlepeaked. Denote by τ (y i , I, C) the preferred tax rate for an individual i with income y i who resides in region I ∈ C. Hence,
Preferences over Partitions
If a region changes the country it belongs to, residents in that region will face a different degree of cultural heterogeneity, a different tax rate, and a different level of public good. 9 An agent residing in region I, faced with the choice of I belonging to C or C , prefers the first alternative if
where τ (C) is the tax rate chosen by majority voting at the country-level. 10 This implies that an agent understands that the resulting tax rate depends on the country his region belongs to. 9 The level of the public good depends both on the tax rate and the total income of the country. 10 Since preferences over τ are single-peaked, this τ (C) is well defined.
Since changing the country a region belongs to affects the tax rates, public goods, and cultural heterogeneity, it is not immediately obvious who will be a region's decisive agent. Based on "intermediate preferences" of Grandmont (1978) and the "consecutive property" of Greenberg and Weber (1985), we therefore impose the following condition on the utility function. Assume region I faces two options: to be part of country C with the proportional tax rate τ or join country
C where the tax rate is τ . Then, if for every triple of agents {1, 2, 3} in region I, with incomes y 1 < y 2 < y 3 , agents 1 and 3 prefer to be in country C, then the same choice would be made by the intermediate agent 2. This condition is formally stated as follows:
Assumption 1: Intermediate Preferences. For every region I and countries C ∈ π and C ∈ π with I ∈ C C , two tax rates τ , τ , and three individuals residing in region I with incomes
This condition is satisfied by a large class of functions. 11
The intermediate preferences assumption solves the multi-dimensionality issue, as it implies that the preferences of a region's median income agent represent those of the majority of its residents. This is referred to as the decisiveness of the median agent (Gans and Smart, 1996) . For every region I, denote by y m (I) the median income. And for every region I in C, let v m (I, C) be the value of the indirect utility of the median income agent in I when the tax rate in C is given by τ (C):
We then have:
Lemma 1: Median Decisiveness. For every region I and countries C ∈ π and C ∈ π with I ∈ C C we have
11 See, e.g., Greenberg and Weber (1985) and Demange (1994) . In particular, it contains the functional forms considered in Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) , where the degree of heterogeneity is represented by the type or location of the public good. In fact, it also contains the utility functions of the type u(x, g, I, C) = x δ + Φ(g, H(I, C)), where Φ is an arbitrary continuous function, with 0 < δ ≤ 1. This includes the case the quasi-linear case with δ equal to 1, considered in our empirical investigation.
if and only if
Proof: See Appendix.
The result of median decisiveness will facilitate our analysis of the stability of a partition, as it allows us to only focus on the preferences of the median income agents of the different regions.
It is important to point out that in our framework the benefit of a region from being part of a certain country depends solely on the composition of that country and not on the number and composition of the other countries. This links our model to the theory of hedonic games, introduced by Drèze and Greenberg (1980) , where the payoff of a player depends exclusively upon the group to which she belongs. 12 
Stability
We now turn our attention to the stability of partitions. Several stability concepts have been applied in the literature. 13 We consider two such concepts in our paper. The first one, called Limited Right of Map Redrawing, requires, subject to majority voting, the approval of any map redrawing by all affected regions. 14 The second concept, called unilateral secession, is a modification of the core, and it requires only the approval, by majority voting, of the seceding region. 15 
LRMR-Stability
The Limited Right of Map Redrawing stability concept, denoted LRMR-stability, says that a partition is stable if there is no other partition preferred by a majority of agents in each region affected by the change in partition. In other words, changing a partition would need the consent of all affected parties. The Canadian Clarity Act of 2000, which regulates the possible secession of a Canadian province, is an example. Under this act, secession requires an amendment to the constitution, thus involving negotiations with the governments of all provinces.
We now formalize the LRMR-stability concept. For every region I ∈ N and partition π ∈ Π denote by C I (π) the country in π that contains I. We can then state the following definition:
Definition 1: LRMR-Domination. Partition π ∈ Π LRMR-dominates partition π ∈ Π if for every region affected by the shift from π to π , the majority of its residents prefers partition π over π. That is, for every region I with C I (π) = C I (π ) we have
Our definition of LRMR-domination allows us to define LRMR-stability.
The set of LRMR-stable partitions can be shown to be nonempty.
Proposition 2. The set of LRMR-stable partitions is nonempty.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Recall that Π was defined as the set of possible partitions. When empirically analyzing the stability of a given partition, it may be convenient to restrict the set of possible partitions to be smaller than the set of all partitions. Indeed, the formation of a country may be limited by various geographical, political or historical considerations. For example, it is unusual for countries to consist of geographically disconnected regions. Previous violent conflicts or wars may also prevent the co-existence of certain regions within the same country. Some of these restrictions, which are exogenous to the model, will play a role in the empirical analysis.
ULS-Stability
LRMR-Stability assumes that no map redrawing can take place without the consent of all affected To deal with this possibility, we introduce the unilateral secession stability concept, denoted ULS-stability, which says that a partition is stable only if no majority in any of the regions wants to break away. To formalize this concept, we start by defining ULS-domination.
Our concept of ULS-domination allows to define stability under unilateral secession.
Definition 4: ULS-Stability.
A partition π ∈ Π is ULS-stable if there is no π ∈ Π that ULS-dominates π.
It is trivial to see that the set of ULS-stable partitions is non-empty. Indeed, a partition that consists of each region being a separate country is always ULS-stable. Therefore, Proposition 3. The set of ULS-stable partitions is nonempty.
As in the case of LRMR-stability, in our empirical applications we may wish to restrict the set of possible partitions Π to take into account certain limitations that have not been explicitly modeled. For example, the core region of a country, in its capacity of hegemon, may perceive additional benefits from keeping the country together, thus preventing it from wanting to leave the union.
When studying the possible break-up of a country, we are not only interested in its stability, but also in understanding the relative incentives of different regions to secede, and the possible dynamics of disintegration. To address this issue, let us introduce a secession function, s(I, C), which measures the propensity of I to secede from C. In the empirical section, s(I, C) will be a function of the utility difference between separating and remaining within the union, v m (I, I) − v m (I, C).
Consider the following process. Take max I s(I, C I (π 0 )), where π 0 is the starting partition. If it is non-positive, no secession takes place, and the original partition is ULS-stable. If not, the region with the maximum value secedes, generating a new partition, π 1 . We then take max I s(I, C I (π 1 )).
If it is non-positive, no further secession takes place. If not, the region with the maximum value secedes, generating the partition π 2 , and so on. Since the process is finite, there is a terminal partition, which is obviously ULS-stable.
Our Specification
To bring our theoretical model to the data, we adopt the following quasi-linear functional form for the utility of a resident of region I ∈ C:
where α > 0 and β > 0 are exogenously given parameters, and Z(I, C) is a 'discount factor', whose range is between 0 and 1. This utility function satisfies the intermediate preferences assumption.
Since cultural heterogeneity reduces the utility an agent derives from the consumption of the public good g, the value of Z(I, C) is negatively correlated with the cultural heterogeneity faced by a resident of region I in country C. More specifically, we assume that for such an agent the discount factor is given by
where
The parameter δ is important in two respects. First, since H(I, C) is between 0 and 1, the smaller is δ, the greater is the cost of heterogeneity. If δ is very small, the value of Z(I, C) in a multi-regional country is close to zero. In other words, a small δ implies that in such a country any amount of public consumption becomes almost useless. Second, the smaller is δ, the more convex is the discount factor Z. For small values of δ, the discount factor exhibits a high degree of convexity, so that the relative effect of increasing heterogeneity on Z is larger at lower levels of heterogeneity.
If agents reside in one-region countries, the discount factor Z(I, I) is equal to one, regardless of the value of δ.
The indirect utility of an individual i with income y i , residing in region I ∈ C, where the tax rate is τ , is
We can now explicitly derive τ (y i , I, C), the preferred tax rate for an individual i with income y i who resides in region I ∈ C:
Notice that, in general, for I, J ∈ C we have Z(I, C) = Z(J, C). In other words, the cost of cultural heterogeneity tends to be different for agents living in different regions of the same country. As a result, two individuals with the same income level, but residing in different regions of country C, typically have different preferred tax rates. This implies that the median agent in country C does not necessarily coincide with the agent with the median income in C. This feature has important consequences for the empirical part of the paper. Finding the preferred tax rate of a coalition of regions forming a country becomes more laborious than just finding the preferred tax rate of the median income agent. Of course, when a country is formed by only one region, this problem disappears, and the agent with the median income becomes the decisive one in determining the tax rate.
Genetic and Cultural Distances
Before analyzing the stability of Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia, we provide support for our choice of using genetic distances as a proxy for cultural distances between populations. The question we ask is: Are genetic distances correlated to cultural distances? Our strategy to answer this question is to compare a matrix of genetic distances to a matrix of cultural distances. The To compute cultural distances from the WVS, we take the 430 questions related to Perception of Life, Family, and Religion and Moral from the four waves currently available online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Each question has q different possible answers and we denote by a i,j = ( a 1 i,j , a 2 i,j , . . . , a q i,j ) the vector of relative answers to question i in nation j. For example, suppose that question i has three possible answers, a 1 , a 2 and a 3 . The vector a i,j = (1/2, 0, 1/2) indicates that in nation j, half of the people answers a 1 and the other half a 3 . We construct a matrix of cultural distances between nations such that the (j, k) element of the matrix represents the average Manhattan distance between nation j and nation k:
All our results are robust to the usage of the Euclidean distance instead of the Manhattan distance in (10) Both distance matrices are reported in the Appendix. Although matrix D covers more countries, and also some regions within countries, the comparison between both matrices is done on the basis of 14 European countries. , j) , where the x-coordinate is the genetic distance between i and j, and the y-coordinate is the WVS distance between i and j. Figure 1 suggests a strong positive relation between genetic and cultural distances.
We now compute the correlation between both matrices, and assess its statistical significance. Due to the triangle inequality property, the elements of a distance matrix are not independent, so that we cannot use standard methods to determine the statistical significance of the observed correlation between matrices D and W . To address this issue, we rely on the Mantel test, a nonparametric randomization procedure often used in Population Genetics. 17 The significance of the correlation is evaluated via the random permutation of rows and columns of one of the matrices.
For each random permutation, the correlation r between the two matrices is re-computed. After a sufficient number of permutations, the distribution of values of r is generated, and the critical value of the test at the chosen level of significance is determined.
The correlation coefficient between matrices D and W is 0.56 and the hypothesis of nonpositive correlation is strongly rejected based on a Mantel test with 100, 000 replications (p-value of 0.00014). This highly significant correlation provides the foundation for our use of the matrix of genetic distances as a proxy for the cultural heterogeneity among European countries.
If the justification for using matrix D is based on its correlation with the matrix W , one might argue that it would be better to directly use W for our analysis. However, the matrix W is based on opinion polls, and although we focus on questions related to people's long term preferences, their answers may still be distorted by short term events. In that sense, we are interested in analyzing the correlation between W and D, not because W is an unbiased measure of the true cultural distances, but because a lack of positive correlation would raise doubts about using D as a proxy for those unknown cultural distances.
Another possible concern is that there might be better proxies for cultural distances than genetic distances. Two alternatives come to mind: geographic distances and linguistic distances.
To explore this possibility, we compute a matrix of geographic distances, G, and a matrix of linguistic distances, L, between European countries. 18 We then determine the significance of the partial correlation between genetic distances (D) and cultural distances (W ), after controlling for geographic distances (G) and linguistic distances (L). This is done by using a partial Mantel 
In that case country i will be closer to country j than to country k in the answers given to the WVS if the genetic distance between i and j is smaller than between i and k.
As a further robustness check, we also assess the significance of the partial correlation be- In other words, when controlling for the other two distances, only the partial correlation between genetic distances and cultural distances continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a clear correlation between genetic distances and modern cultural distances has been reported in the literature. This result provides an argument in favor of using genetic distances as a proxy for cultural distances between populations.
Stability of Europe
In this section we determine the 'weak links' in the current map of Europe: Which regions are more likely to secede? And which countries are more likely to form a union? Using information on 18 Geographic distances were calculated "as the crow flies", and the coordinates of each region were obtained from Simoni et al. (2000) . Linguistic distances between countries are computed using data on the linguistic composition of each country from the Ethnologue project and data on the distance between Indo-European languages from Dyen cultural distances between European regions and countries, we start by estimating values of α, β and δ that yield an LRMR-stable partition of Europe. This exercise is of interest in itself, since as a way of validating our theoretical framework, it seems important that the set of parameter values consistent with stability is not empty. However, once we have calibrated the parameter values to the stability of Europe, we can go one step further and explore the 'weak links' in the map. For example, by increasing the cost associated with cultural heterogeneity, we can check which region would be the first one to secede. Our exercise covers most of Europe, but leaves out some countries, such as ex-Yugoslavia, whose disintegration we will study in detail in Section 5.
Data
We rely on genetic distances to proxy for cultural distances. To find parameter values that render the European map stable, it is important to have information, not just on countries, but also on regions. Indeed, to limit the range of δ from above and from below, it is not enough to make sure that no existing countries want to unite, we must also guarantee that no existing regions want to Given the small population of Lapland, less than 100,000 and spread over three countries, we do not use this region in our subsequent analysis. We also drop Yugoslavia, as that country disintegrated in the 1990s. v.2.0a, collected by the United Nations University. Since those data are not available for all years, we take the year which is closest to 2000. The income distributions of regions are taken to be the same as those of the countries they belong to.
For those countries for which we have information on regions, we need to distinguish in the data between the country, the region, and the country net of the region. Take the case of Spain.
If the question is whether the Basque Country wants to separate, the two relevant decision makers are the Basque Country and the rest of the Spain. However, if the question is whether Spain wants to unite with Portugal, the two relevant decision makers are Spain (including the Basque Country) and Portugal.
Estimation Strategy
Our strategy is to first calibrate α and β using data on a set of European and OECD countries, so that we are left with only one degree of freedom, the parameter δ. Because we have no comprehensive data on genetic distances between regions within countries, our approach is to estimate α and β abstracting from within-country cultural heterogeneity. For this approach to be reasonable, we focus on a set of countries that are culturally relatively homogeneous. For want of data on genetic diversity, we use information on linguistic diversity to define such a set. Based on the ranking of linguistic diversity by Desmet et al. (2009), we only include countries in the bottom one third of that ranking, and take those countries to be culturally homogeneous for our estimation procedure.
The tax rate adopted by a culturally homogeneous country C is
where y m(C) is the median income in C. To estimate α and β, we thus need data on the tax rate, τ (C), the median income, y m(C) , and the total income, Y (C). For the tax rate, we take the ratio of government spending on public goods to total GDP. As a measure of public goods we take 'general public services' from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database, collected by the IMF.
We use data for those European and OECD countries in the GFS database that are in the bottom one third of countries in terms of linguistic diversity. This gives us information on a total of 15 countries.
We estimate (11) by applying nonlinear least squares. The results are reported in Table   1 . In addition to focusing on the sample of 15 culturally homogeneous countries, for the purpose of subsequent robustness checks we consider a number of other alternatives to estimate α and β.
First, we re-estimate the parameter values on the entire sample of European and OECD countries.
Although this doubles the sample size, it comes at the cost of including countries that are culturally relatively heterogeneous. Second, rather than considering all countries to be culturally homogeneous, we re-estimate the parameter values assuming that all countries have a common (positive) degree of cultural heterogeneity. In particular, we set the cultural discount factor, Z(I, C), equal to 0.3 for all countries. Recall that Z(I, C) has a value between 0 and 1, with lower values indicating higher degrees of cultural heterogeneity. The resulting estimates of α and β for these alternative approaches are also reported in Table 1 . Table 1 : Estimation of α and β Now that we have estimates for α and β, we compute the range of δ that guarantees the stability of the current map of Europe. We restrict our analysis to the set of partitions which contain the current map, all possible secessions (Basque Country-Spain, Scotland-Britain, Sardinia-Italy), and all possible mergers between country pairs. In other words, we do not consider all partitions.
For example, we do not allow for unions between more than two countries, or for regions switching allegiances from one country to another. In as far as larger unions start off small, and in as far as a region must first secede before joining another country, our restricted set of partitions seems reasonable. In any case, in Section 4.4 we will return to the issue of unions between more than two countries.
To determine the range of δ that ensures LRMR-stability, we start by analyzing the condition for no region to secede. Consider the three regions in our database (Basque Country, Sardinia, and Scotland) and the three countries they belong to (Spain, Italy, and Britain). For secession to occur, there needs to be a majority in both the seceding region and in the rest of the country.
For instance, if the Basque Country is to separate, a majority of Basques and a majority of the population in the rest of Spain should approve. 22 This implies that for the Basque Country and 22 If we had data on more Spanish regions, then LRMR-stability would require a majority in all Spanish regions.
the rest of Spain to remain united, it is enough that one of the two parties prefers to maintain the union. Recall that the higher is δ, the smaller is the cost of heterogeneity, and thus the stronger the preference to remain united. The net gain of the union for the median agent of region I can thus be written as an (increasing) function of δ,
A similar condition must hold for the rest of the country. By analogy, for the median income agent of the rest of the country C/I, the net gain of keeping country C united, rather than letting region I secede, is
As before, this net gain is an increasing function of δ, since a higher value of δ implies attaching a lower cost to cultural heterogeneity.
In order to prevent secession under LRMR-stability, it suffices that one of the two parties, the potentially breakaway region or the rest of the country, prefers to remain united. Thus, a first necessary condition for the current European partition to be LRMR-stable is the existence of a nonempty set of the parameter δ for which at least one of the functions (12) and (13) is positive for each of the pairs Basque Country-Spain, Sardinia-Italy, and Scotland-Britain. The set of δ for which secession does not occur can thus be defined as
The range of δ for which this condition holds is obtained numerically. In particular, we find that for any δ ≥ 0.0284, no region will secede from their respective country. The no-secession condition thus provides a lower bound on the value of δ. This is consistent with the fact that higher values of δ imply lower costs of cultural heterogeneity.
However, our database never has information on more than one region within each country, so that any possible secession needs the approval of the majority in the seceding region and of the majority in the rest of the country taken as a whole.
We now analyze the condition ensuring that no country pairs want to unite. To determine the preferred tax rate in a possible union between, say, C and C , we first need to identify the median voter. Because the cultural heterogeneity 'discount factor' Z is not the same for all agents, the median voter need not coincide with the median income agent of the union. To solve this problem,
we proceed in the following way. We compute the average income of an agent in each decile of the income distribution for both countries C and C . This, together with data on population and income, allows us to determine for the union of C and C the preferred tax rate of each one of these agents. In the case of the union between two countries, gives us 20 tax rates. Given that preferences over tax rates are single peaked, we can find the optimal tax rate for the decisive agent. This is done by ordering the 20 tax rates mentioned above, and taking the one which corresponds to half of the population of the union.
The net gain obtained by the median income agent in country C from joining country C can be written as
A second necessary condition for the European map to be LRMR-stable is that there is no country pair for which a majority in both countries wants to unite. Formally, there is no pair C, C , such that g C,C (δ) > 0 and g C ,C (δ) > 0. The set of δ for which no two nations want to unite is then
Numerically, we find that for any δ ≤ 0.147, no two countries want to join. The no-union condition thus provides an upper bound on δ. If the value of δ surpasses this upper bound, the importance attached to cultural heterogeneity is no longer sufficient to keep certain country pairs from uniting.
Combining the conditions for 'no secession' and 'no union', a necessary and sufficient condition for LRMR-stability is that 
Secessions and Unions between Country Pairs
We now determine which regions are more likely to secede, and which country pairs are more likely to unite. To understand how this can be done, recall that if δ < 0.0284, cultural distances become sufficiently important, so that we cannot prevent secessions from happening. Therefore, by progressively lowering δ, we can rank regions according to the risk they pose to the union.
Likewise, if δ > 0.147, the weight put on cultural distances becomes small enough, so that some currently independent nations would prefer to unite. Thus, by progressively increasing δ, we can rank country pairs, depending on how likely they are to unite. Unions between large and small countries are absent from our list too. The economic gains for the large country would be too limited. However, not all unions are between small countries. Although large countries stand to gain less from unification than small countries, if they are sufficiently similar, they may still prefer to join. This is the case of France and Britain, which rank in fourth position. These two countries have identical population sizes (a difference of 1%), identical levels of GDP per capita (a difference of 2%), and they are in the 10th percentile of genetically least distant countries. This last observation is common to all country pairs in the top-10: all are genetically close, none drops below the 20th percentile of most similar country pairs. Since countries tend to consist of geographically connected regions, it may be reasonable to restrict possible unions to country pairs that are neighbors. The results are reported in the second column in Table 3 . 24 Austria and Switzerland are still the two countries most likely to unite.
They are followed by Denmark-Norway, France-Britain, France-Italy and Belgium-Netherlands.
Not surprisingly, many of the country pairs were actually united at some point in history. Norway The third column in Table 3 The last column in Table 4 takes the genetic distance between any two countries to be constant and equal to 79, corresponding to the average distance in the Cavalli-Sforza matrix.
When switching off differences in genetic distances across country pairs, we see that country pairs, such as Greece-Portugal and Norway-Finland, become now likely to unite. These country pairs fit the standard pattern of being of similar sizes and similar levels of GDP per capita, but they did not make it into the top-10 in column 1 because of the relatively large genetic distances between them. At the same time, some other country pairs, such as Belgium-Netherlands, are no longer in the top-10. This suggests that genetic closeness is decisive for cooperation between the two.
Full Stability
In the previous section we limited the set of feasible partitions to the current partition, all unions between country pairs, and all secessions. In order to expand this set, one has to face the constraint of computing capacity. Indeed, the number of all possible partitions of the 21 countries and the 3 regions in our database amounts to 445,958,869,294,805,289. Moreover, determining who is the agent with the median optimal tax rate in each partition is extremely laborious, because, due to cultural heterogeneity, the decisive agent need not coincide with the median income agent. This is one reason for why in Section 4.3 we limited our analysis to unions of two countries. The other reason is that in a dynamic framework, where larger unions between multiple countries start off as smaller unions between a few, focusing on country pairs is of interest per se.
In this section we revisit the problem of global stability and consider the set of all possible partitions. To cut through the computational problem, we introduce two restrictions. First, instead of looking at all of Europe, we focus on the EU-15, and leave out the peripheral countries, such as Ireland, Finland and Sweden. In absence of data for Luxembourg, this leaves us with 11 countries, and 'only' 678,570 possible partitions. Second, we assume that in each country the level of the public good is chosen to maximize the total utility of its residents. It is easy to see that maximizing total utility in a nation is equivalent to maximizing the population-weighted average of the utility of the mean income residents of the different regions. In that case, the tax rate adopted in country C is the solution to
where y(I) is the mean income in region I. One can easily show that the solution to (14) is given by
To compute the tax rate (15), we only need information on population, total GDP and cultural distances, without having to identify the median agent for each partition. As a result, calculating welfare for each of the 678,570 partitions becomes a computationally feasible task. It is straightforward to adjust the LRMR-stability concept to make the mean income agent the decisive one.
We only need to replace 'the majority of its residents' in Definition 1 (LRMR-Domination) by the 'mean income agent'.
We want to emphasize that we adopted this approach with the sole goal of simplifying the problem computationally. From a theoretical point of view, this simplification may come at a cost. However, from an empirical point of view it turns out that this 'mean agent' framework is a good 'proxy' of the previous approach. To reach this conclusion, we recalculated our derivations in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, using a 'mean agent' rather than a 'median agent' framework. Since none of the previous results changed, adopting this simplification does not seem to come at the cost of losing realism.
We compute total welfare for each of the 678, 570 partitions and select the partition that yields the maximum. The result depends, obviously, on the chosen value of the parameter δ. We find that, at an accuracy level of 0.00001, there exists a 'critical' value of δ * = 0.04066, such that for δ < δ * the current partition of Europe maximizes total welfare, and is therefore LRM Rstable, whereas for δ > δ * the union of all countries maximizes total welfare, so that the EU would be LRM R-stable. In other words, the only two LRMR-stable partitions of Europe is either full integration or full independence.
This result is subject to two caveats. First, the absence of configurations other than full union or full disintegration is not a general feature of the model. One can easily generate examples for subsets of the countries analyzed in this paper for which the efficient partition implies the union of some, but not all, countries. For example, if we were to focus on Sweden, Denmark and Greece, then for values of δ ∈ [0.18, 0.21], the LRMR-stable partition consists of the union of only Denmark and Sweden. Second, in our model we do not impose any restrictions on how unions are formed.
Even if a union between all countries is the efficient outcome, whether a full union is reached or not would obviously depend on the dynamics of how unions are formed. The literature on whether preferential trade agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks to global free trade may be of interest here.
Breakup of Yugoslavia
In this section we analyze the dynamics of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Within the framework of our model, we ask two questions. Was Yugoslavia unstable? And, if so, what does our model say about the dynamics of its disintegration? Our strategy in answering these questions is as follows. Using the calibrated parameter values for α, β and δ from Section 4, we start by analyzing whether any (or several) of the Yugoslav republics wants to unilaterally break away from the rest of Yugoslavia.
If at least one republic prefers to leave the union, we conclude that Yugoslavia is unstable. We then go one step further by studying the dynamic process of disintegration. We assume that the republic that gains most from secession breaks away first. Once that republic has left, we recompute the incentives for secession for the remaining republics, given that they are now part of a diminished 
Data
We compute genetic distances between the six Yugoslav republics -Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia, Slovenia and Croatia -using allele frequencies of different genes. Given that for the Yugoslav republics Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) provide information on only a limited number of genes, we rely on the Allele Frequency Database (ALFRED) at the Yale Medical School to complement our data. As in Cavalli-Sforza (1994), we use the F ST measure to compute genetic distances, thus making our distance matrix comparable to the one we used for European countries in previous sections. Table 5 gives the genetic distances between the six Yugoslav republics. With the exception of Montenegro, these distances are based on a reasonable number of genes. In any case, as we argue later, the exact value of these different distances does not matter as much as the average order of magnitude. 25 Abstracting from Montenegro, the average distance between two republics is 33, similar to the distance between, say, France and the Netherlands, but larger than the distances between, for example, Belgium and the Netherlands or Germany and Austria.
25 To be precise, leaving out Montenegro, the average number of genes used in computing the genetic distance between two republics is 12. Although this is substantially less than the average number of genes used by CavalliSforza et al. (1994) to compute genetic distances between European countries, it is enough to give us an order of magnitude. In the case of Montenegro, the average number of genes used is only 3, so the order of magnitude of distances involving Montenegro may be off. in relative output per capita, using gross social product may introduce some error if the weight of these nonproductive services differ across republics. To address this issue, it is desirable to complement the social product measure with a more standard output measure. In our benchmark exercise we will therefore take the average of the output per capita and population data of 1984 and
2004. 26 To make our data comparable to the ones of Europe, GDP per capita is expressed relative to the EU-25. As can be seen in Table 6 , differences across republics were substantial, especially in the case of Slovenia, which had a GDP per capita 165 percent higher than the Yugoslav average. Table 6 : GDP per capita and population 26 Though not in the model, another reason for taking the average of 1984 and 2004 would be if agents were forward-looking and took into account how secession changes future output per capita.
The Dynamics of Breakup
We now use the calibrated parameter values of α, β and δ to see whether the theoretical model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia. While we have assigned exact values to α and β, recall that there is a range δ ∈ [0.0284, 0.147] consistent with Europe being stable. High values within that range correspond to agents attaching little weight to cultural heterogeneity, whereas low values within that range imply agents care a lot about cultural differences. In light of what actually happened in Yugoslavia, we allow for unilateral secessions, and thus take ULS-stability to be the relevant stability concept. That is, it is enough for a majority in a given republic to be in favor of independence for the republic to break away. Furthermore, we assume that the set of all possible partitions excludes Serbia from unilaterally seceding. This reflects Serbia being the hegemon. as reflected by the negative numbers in the third column ('round 3'). However, if agents give more weight to cultural distances, the disintegration does not stop there. This can be seen in Table   8 , which does the same exercise, but now sets δ to its lowest possible value within the calibrated range [0.0284, 0.147]. As expected, this increases the incentive to secede. The order of secession is now: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. Compared to the first exercise reported in Table   7 , the first two countries are the same, but because cultural differences now weigh more, Bosnia The overall picture that emerges from these experiments is that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a close call. Whether all of Yugoslavia was bound to break up, whether only Slovenia and Croatia were likely to leave, or even whether there was a possibility of the union staying together, essentially depends on how much weight is attached to cultural distances. This is a reasonable outcome: if under all possible parameter values the model were to predict the break-up of Yugoslavia, then one could wonder why it did not happen earlier, or how the country came into being in the first place. 29 Although the breakup of Yugoslavia may have been a close call, our results clearly indicate that Yugoslavia was more unstable than the rest of Europe. Indeed, for the range of parameter values for which the model predicts the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the rest of Europe is stable.
That is, compared to, say, the Basque Country and Scotland, two of Europe's regions where the demands for self-determination are greatest, Slovenia and Croatia had a greater incentive to secede.
If any nation in Europe was unstable, it was Yugoslavia. 30 This finding holds up when we apply the 29 It is important to remember that Yugoslavia was not an accident of history. The country's foundation was laid by the Corfu Declaration in 1917 signed by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Its preamble stated that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were "the same by blood, by language, by the feelings of their unity, by the continuity and integrity of the territory..." Consistent with what we said before, cultural differences were not that huge, and depending on the weight given to them, the model predicts Yugoslavia surviving as a union or breaking apart.
same stability ULS-stability concept to both Yugoslavia and the rest of Europe. In other words, if we allow for unilateral secession, Slovenia and Croatia are more keen on breaking away than either the Basque Country or Scotland.
Another relevant question is what was the role of culture and what was the role of economics in Yugoslavia's breakup. After all, it has often been argued that cultural distances between the different Yugoslav republics were not particularly great. Our matrix of genetic distances between the different republics largely subscribes to this view: the average distance of 33 is similar to the distance between Scotland and England or between Belgium and France. However, the fact that these cultural distances are relatively small does not imply that they do not matter. To see this, we run a counterfactual experiment by assuming that Yugoslavia was culturally completely homogeneous. In that case we find that all republics want to remain within the union. Cultural differences, though small, were essential for the country's disintegration. Economic differences, though large, were not enough to cause the breakup of Yugoslavia.
However, the order of disintegration as predicted by the model is driven by economics. The first two republics to leave, Slovenia and Croatia, were, respectively, the richest republic and the largest republic, whereas the republic that never wants to leave according to the model, Montenegro, is very small, with a population of just over half a million. Although some republics were culturally more distant than others, this does not matter in determining the order of breakup. If we re-do our experiments setting all distances between all republics equal to the average distance of 33, all results go through. In fact, if we set a slightly higher number of 50 or a slightly lower number of 15, the order of incentives for secession still does not change. Given that some of the distances in our matrix were based on a limited number of genes, and are thus less reliable, this is reassuring because it suggests that the results do not depend on the exact distances, but rather on the average order of magnitude.
As a final test for the robustness of our results, we ask whether a republic's decision to secede, when it does, is a dominant strategy. To give an example, consider the second column ('round 3') in Table 8 , which predicts that Bosnia leaves the union of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro.
To see whether Bosnia's decision is a dominant strategy, we ask whether Bosnia would still want to secede from any possible partition of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro. 31 The answer is 31 As before, we assume that Serbia never secedes.
'yes'. More generally, it turns out that only allowing for secession when it is a dominant strategy does not change any of the results.
The Monetary Gains from Breakup
As another way of representing the incentives to secede, it is informative to determine the monetary gains (equivalent variation) from leaving the union. To do so, we determine the "income tax on secession", r(I, C), that renders the median agent of the seceding republic, I, indifferent between breaking away or remaining part of the union of republics that have not yet seceded, C. If, say, a 10% "secession tax" is needed to convince a republic to stay within the union, then the relative monetary gain from secession is approximately 10%. To determine r(I, C) for each region I that is part of union C we solve for r(I, C) in the following equation:
where Y (I) = Y (I)(1 − r(I, C)) denotes total income after the "secession tax" in region I and y m (I) denotes the income after the "secession tax" of the median income agent in region I. 32 Table 9 : Relative monetary gain from breakup (δ = 0.147) Table 9 reports the relative monetary gains of unilateral secession, as measured by r, giving a low weight to cultural distances (δ = 0.147). As before, only Slovenia and Croatia want to secede, and their monetary gains are limited: Slovenia only gains 2.6% in terms of GDP whereas Croatia gains less than 2%. The other republics do not break away, and if they did, their losses would have been substantial. Table 10 reports the results for the case of a high weight given to cultural distances (δ = 0.0284). Once again, the results are similar to the ones of Table 8 , with the exception that Croatia secedes before Slovenia. However, the monetary gains are now much more substantial. 32 The optimal tax rate of the median income agent, τ (I), is calculated for the after "secession tax" income levels. Table 10 : Relative monetary gain from breakup (δ = 0.0284)
Monetary gains from breakup

Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a theory where larger countries benefit from scale economies in the provision of public goods but suffer from greater cultural heterogeneity. It has then empirically and To make such quantitative models richer, we see at least three main areas that would benefit from future research. First, integration and cooperation between regions and countries may take many different forms. Regions may have high degrees of autonomy, without fully seceding.
Countries may closely cooperate, without fully uniting. By incorporating those possibilities into the theoretical framework, one could empirically study the degree of decentralization and cooperation.
Second, large coalitions, such as the present-day European Union, started off much smaller. Since there is likely to be path-dependence in coalition formation, better understanding these dynamics is important. Third, map redrawing may have effects that go beyond tax rates and public goods.
For example, central (capital) regions may not want to see peripheral regions go, because much of their wealth stems from being the center.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a region I and two different countries C ∈ π and C ∈ π such that I ∈ C C . First, suppose that the inequality v(y i , τ (C), I, C) > v(y i , τ (C ), I, C )) (17) holds for more than half of region I's population. By our Intermediate Preferences assumption, the range of y i that satisfies (17) is an interval, and since it contains more than half of region I's population, the interval must include the median agent y m (I). Hence, we have v m (I, C) > v m (I, C ).
Assume now that v m (I, C) > v m (I, C ). By Intermediate Preferences, there exists no pair y, y with y < y m (I) < y such that v(y, τ (C), I, C) < v(y, τ (C ), I, C )) and v(y , τ (C), I, C) < v(y ), I, C )).
Thus, the preferences of the median agent are shared by at least half of the residents of region I, either by those income above or below the median. The continuity of utility functions and the fact that the distribution function F I (y) is strictly increasing implies that an strict majority of the residents of I prefer C to C . Q.E.D.
Proof of the Proposition 2: For every partition π ∈ Π denote R(π) = I∈N v m (I, C I (π)).
We say that π is a median-efficient partition if and only if R(π) = max π ∈Π R(π ). Tables   Table B. 
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